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Increasing numbers of Chinese companies are developing 
connections in Africa with the aim of increasing trade between 
China and the African continent. This relationship between China 
and Africa has not happened unnoticed but the discussion in the 
West is not well informed. Questions about how to deal with this 
development and its consequences are being raised. This paper is a 
first attempt to fill this lacuna and presents an overview of Sino-
African relations, China’s aid programme to Africa and the state of 
trade relations, with special emphasis on natural resources and the 
export market for Chinese products and investments in Africa. 
 
 
1. Sino-African Relations in the Past 
 
The relationship between China and Africa has evolved noticeably 
over the last five decades and three separate periods can be 
distinguished within this timeframe. Initially, relationships were 
established between China and African nation states as they gained 
independence. Then came the period when China was given a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 1971. The final phase 
covers the post-Maoist period and is characterized by the 
liberalization and subsequent growth of the Chinese economy.  
 
China’s relationship with Africa started to develop in the early 1950s. 
Before 1955, Africa was of no significant importance to China but 
from then onwards, China sought international recognition and 
political allies, hoping to strengthen international alliances against 
the capitalist West and the revisionist communist Soviet Union.2
 The Bandung Conference was held in 1955. This meeting of 29 
Asian and African states aimed to promote economic and cultural 
relations between the two continents. The topics that were on the 
                                                 
1 The information in this working paper was compiled by Judith van de Looy at the 
African Studies Centre in Leiden and presented at the ‘Afrikadag’ organized by the 
Evert Vermeer Stichting at the Haagse Hogeschool in The Hague on 22 April 2006. 
2 Kanza, T.M. (1975) ‘Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa; An African View’, in W. 
Weinstein (ed.), Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa, New York: Praeger Publishers. 
agenda included colonialism, imperialism and the hegemonic 
position of the Western powers. According to Wright, 
 
The conference enhanced the unity and co-operation of the 
Asian and African countries, inspired by the people in the 
colonies to struggle for national liberation and played a 
significant role in promoting the anti-imperialist and anti-
colonial struggle of the Asian and African people.3
 
What all the countries had in common was their shared history and 
their perception of white dominance by the West. Statements such as 
‘We all belong to the Third World, we are developing countries’4 
were commonly heard at this time. During the conference, China and 
the African states adopted the five principles of ‘Peaceful 
Coexistence’ that had earlier been formulated by India and China. 
These covered (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) 
peaceful coexistence.5  
 Following the conference, China supported African countries 
with economic, technical and military support in an attempt to 
restrain the dominant western powers and create a new political and 
international order. African states were at the same time seeking 
allies to help them win their fight for independence and financial 
support to fund these struggles. From 1966 to 1969, Chinese attention 
towards Africa was diverted due to domestic changes and the great 
proletarian Cultural Revolution. After internal disputes had been 
settled, China began to establish new relationships on the African 
continent.6
 According to Larkin, Sino-African relations in the 1970s had 
five key characteristics. First, the number of African countries with 
diplomatic ties gradually increased. In 1967, China had 13 diplomatic 
missions in Africa and by 1974 this number had increased to 30.  
                                                 
3 Wright, R. (1956) ‘The Color Curtain’, in D.J. Muekalia (2004), ‘Africa and China’s 
Strategic Partnership’, African Security Studies, 13 (1): 5–12. 
4 Larkin, B.D. (1975) ‘Chinese Aid in Political Context 1971 – 1975’, in Weinstein, 
Chinese and Soviet Aid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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Box 1: The Battle for Africa 
 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China on Taiwan 
(ROC) have always competed for political recognition. In 1971, the PRC 
replaced the ROC on the United Nations Security Council as the ‘legitimate 
China’. From then onwards, the PRC won recognition from many states, 
leaving the ROC with less international support. In the early 1980s there 
were only 22 states worldwide that recognized the ROC, and the PRC 
became a strategic partner for international issues. Alliances were 
subsequently formed.  
  
With more than 50 states in Africa, there have been opportunities for both 
the ROC and the PRC to establish alliances. Africa was seen as a 
battleground when it came to establishing diplomatic relations. With aid 
programmes and loans, the two governments sought partnerships and thus 
recognition. From the 1990s onwards, competition increased dramatically. 
 
The foreign policies of African countries have for a long time been driven 
by the search for aid and substantial financial contributions have often 
determined the choice made by African governments in this respect. 
However, relations can easily change. For example Liberia, Senegal and the 
Central African Republic have switched allegiances al least five times in the 
past. Currently, there are only six countries that have diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan: Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Malawi, Sao Tomé and Principe, and 
Swaziland.  
 
Sources: 
Liu, P. (2001) ‘Cross-straight Scramble for Africa: A Hidden Agenda in 
China-Africa Cooperation Forum’, Harvard Asia Quarterly, V (2): 
Spring. 
‘China Winning Resources and Loyalties of Africa’, 
www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=7051 (24 March 2006) 
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Second, China joined the United Nations Security Council in 1971, 
taking over Taiwan’s seat and many African states welcomed this 
decision since their political ties with China had increased over the 
years. According to Moussa Traore:  
 
The presence of the PRC in the UN as a permanent member 
of the Security Council (will) contribute notably to the 
strengthening of the capacity of this organization in 
maintaining peace and international security. 7
 
Thirdly, the Tanzania-Zambia railway was the biggest aid project on 
the continent in the 1970s and China was in the process of 
committing itself to more prestigious projects all over Africa. Loyal 
states were offered federal buildings, stadiums, factories, 
infrastructure, medical teams and student exchange programmes.8 
Fourthly, China continued to support the nationalist movements that 
were demanding independence and the end of imperialism. It 
provided military support for Africa on various occasions, as it saw 
the need for African nationalist movements to disentangle 
themselves from the hegemonic West. In fact, the Peking Review of 26 
January 1973 legitimised armed opposition stating that ‘the armed 
struggle is the only way through which colonialism, apartheid and 
racial discrimination in Southern Africa and Guinea can be 
eliminated’.9 Finally, China stressed the existence of a dichotomy 
between the world’s super powers and their weaker opponents, 
assisting the latter in their survival. 
 Starting in 1978, the post-Maoist era was characterized by new 
investments in the economic sector in order to modernize China. The 
country’s foreign policy was therefore mainly focused on economic 
modernization and increased trade relations. According to China, a 
peaceful environment was necessary to develop a stable economy. 
Stability became the major theme in China’s policy towards Africa. A 
few decades earlier, China had held the super powers responsible for 
the then instability on the continent and supported African states in 
their struggle against imperialism. However, China depended 
heavily on the West for technical support and commercial links. 
China acted as a facilitator in the North-South dialogue but it 
nevertheless supported Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia in 
                                                 
7 Ibid.  
8 Snow, P. (1988) The Star Raft: China’s Encounter with Africa, London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson. 
9 Larkin, ‘Chinese Aid’. 
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their struggles against imperialism but only indirectly because of its 
policy of non-interference.10
 During the Cold War, tensions between Moscow and 
Washington grew. China remained independent and focused on 
other countries instead. In December 1982, the Chinese Premier Zhao 
Ziyang visited eleven African countries and promoted the ‘Four 
Principles’ of Chinese cooperation with Africa: equality and mutual 
benefit; an emphasis on practical results; diversity in form; and 
economic development.11
These guiding principles marked a new era in Sino-African 
relations. China no longer wanted to assist Africa unconditionally 
and in order to develop economically, it could not assist Africa with 
costly aid programmes. Moreover, it did not see itself as a 
spokesman for the Third World anymore. In the Beijing Review it was 
stated that ‘Third World countries… should have no leader/follower 
relations among them… Any country which attempts to pose as a 
leader and control others will be spurned’. In fact, during the 1980s, 
Africa became less important for China as it sought international 
recognition from Washington and Moscow and intensified Chinese 
contact with both countries to promote economic development. 
African states were no longer supported by China in their struggle 
against dictators or assisted in times of need because China lacked 
the financial resources to do so.12
 In 1989, the events in Tiananmen Square shocked the western 
world, which questioned the operations of the Chinese government. 
Third World countries were silent and relations were less affected by 
the trouble in Beijing. As a result of these events however, China was 
forced to focus on old relationships, giving African states a new 
priority. From then onwards, South-South cooperation was 
embraced. When official Chinese visits were made to Africa, the 
main theme was non-interference in each other’s affairs. According 
to one official, ‘respect for each other’s affairs and non-interference 
should be the basis of the emerging new international order’, which 
referred indirectly to the position that the West takes regarding 
human rights.13
                                                 
10 Taylor, I. (2001) ‘China’s Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa in the Post-Maoist 
Era, 1978 – 1999’, in F. Columbus (ed.) Politics and Economics of Africa, Volume I, 
New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Beijing Review, 27 December 1983, in Taylor, ‘China’s Relations with Sub-Saharan 
Africa’. 
13 Taylor, ‘China’s Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa’. 
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 The dichotomy between the West and Africa and China, often 
stressed when establishing relations, continues to this day. State 
leaders are still addressing their position towards the west. During a 
speech in China in 2001, President Mbeki announced that: 
 
The world and all of us are defined by the divide between 
rich and poor, the haves and the have-nots, the developed 
and the underdeveloped… It constitutes the difference 
between the countries of the North and those of the South… 
Together with China, we are commonly defined by our 
situation as belonging to the South.14
 
To further cement the relationship between China and Africa, the 
China-Africa Cooperation Forum was established in 2000.  
 
 
2. China’s Aid Agreements 
 
China’s relations with Africa have been characterized by aid 
agreements. In the struggle for independence in Africa, China was 
willing to assist the new nation states with prestigious projects, 
emphasizing that it had given all it could in terms of financial and 
technical resources.15 China’s strategy was simple: it was trying to 
cultivate as many allies as it could and maintain old friendships. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the ROC was also assisting 
African countries and competition between it and the PRC emerged. 
 Today, relations between China and Africa are more 
pragmatic. Trade and mutual benefits are central in current 
partnerships. However, China still supports a number of African 
countries with direct aid. Three major themes can be distinguished: 
building projects; Chinese medical teams; and scholarships for 
Africans to study in China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Speech by Mr Thabo Mbeki at Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, 11 December 
2001. 
15 Thompson, D. (2005) ‘China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the Beijing Consensus 
to Health Diplomacy’, www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp (24 March 2006) 
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Figure 1:  Chinese aid granted to Sub-Saharan Africa 1969 – 1987 
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Source: Bartke (1992) in Taylor (2001) 
 
 
China has assisted Africa with numerous projects, the largest of 
which was the construction of the 1800-km Tanzania-Zambia railway 
which cost over US$450 million. China has also constructed roads, 
wells and telecommunication facilities in Africa, with political allies 
being granted large projects to mark their independence such as 
airports, stadiums, palaces, government buildings and factories. 
 
 
Table 1:  Major types of aid projects by China in Africa 
 
Infrastructure projects railways, roads, telecommunications 
facilities 
Buildings stadiums, palaces, government offices, 
schools 
Factories cotton or textiles, timber, oil, cigarettes 
Agriculture farming, tobacco, tea, sugar production 
 
 
 
Besides the construction of buildings and infrastructure, China 
supports Africa with medical teams too. China has a long history in 
health diplomacy in Africa, with the first medical team having 
started in Algeria in 1964. From then onwards, some 15,000 doctors 
and health workers have been sent to more than 47 African countries. 
Approximately 180 million patients have been treated by Chinese 
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doctors over the years. Nowadays, Chinese medical assistance is 
declining for domestic reasons because fewer Chinese doctors are 
willing to leave their own country to work overseas for two years. 
Statistics do not highlight this trend however as in 2003 there were 
still 860 medical personnel working in 35 teams in 34 different 
countries. African states keep supporting the medical teams, 
covering their expenses and presenting national awards. Most 
importantly perhaps is the fact that these Chinese medical teams are 
building sustainable relations with the African population based on 
expertise and trust.  
 China’s other aid programme in Africa is in the area of human 
resources. One of the agreements made at the China-Africa 
Cooperation Forum related to an increase in human resources. China 
established a fund that is jointly used by several Chinese ministries, 
such as those of foreign affairs, commerce, education, and science 
and technology, and together they are responsible for the training 
and education of Africans. In 2003, 6000 people were trained and 
1500 students visited China on educational exchange programmes. 
By providing these scholarships, China has contributed significantly 
to the development of human resources in Africa. In addition, 
scholarship programmes like these encourage bonds between 
Chinese and African institutions and students.16
 China’s support for Africans through the construction of 
buildings or infrastructure, by giving medical assistance or through 
the development of human resources is a strategy aimed at creating a 
long-term relationship based on mutual respect, understanding and 
friendship. According to Thompson, (2005), the relationship between 
China and Africa must be seen in a broader perspective. 
 
China’s influence and sound relationship in Africa are the 
result of many years of investment in building relations 
through aid, trade, and cultural and technical exchange – not 
just the by-product of China’s recently booming economy 
and soaring demand for African raw materials.17
 
China’s aid to Africa was never unconditional. Over the years, 
Beijing restructured its aid policy and imposed more restrictions. 
Interest-free government loans became discount loans offered 
through Chinese banks and aid grants were replaced by joint 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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ventures and other forms of cooperation. By the late 1990s, China 
had established 480 joint ventures in 47 countries in Africa.18
                                                 
18 Shelton, G. (2001) ‘China and Africa: Building an Economic Partnership’, South 
African Journal of International Affairs, 8 (2): Winter.  
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Table 2:  Chinese assistance, by country 
 
Angola  debt relief, US$2 billion loan 
Benin stadium, government office building, conference centre, 
hospital 
Burkina Faso** - 
Burundi textile mill, hydroelectric power station, highway 
Cameroon conference building, hydroelectric power station, hospitals 
Cape Verde government office building, conference hall 
Chad** - 
Central African 
Republic 
agricultural technological station, radio station, training 
centre, clinics 
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
stadium, hydroelectric power station, broadcasting station, 
hospital, factory 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo (DRC) 
stadium, trade centre, people’s palace, factories 
Comoros government office building, water supply project, people’s 
palace 
Djibouti stadium, government office building, people’s palace, 
housing project 
Eritrea humanitarian assistance, hospital 
Equatorial 
Guinea  
hydroelectric power station, radio station, highways 
Ethiopia highway, veterinary centre, power station, water supply 
project 
Gabon healthcare centre, primary school, assembly building 
Gambia** stadium, hostel, health centres 
Ghana national theatre, irrigation project, vocational training 
centre, hospital 
Guinea people’s palace, hydroelectric power station, cinema, 
presidential palace 
Guinea Bissau housing project, power-generating equipment, technical 
cooperation 
Ivory Coast theatre, water conservation project 
Lesotho vegetable planting, convention centre, industrial park 
Liberia sugar mill, rice project, sports stadium, hospital renovation, 
office building 
Malawi** - 
Mali stadium, conference building, textile mill, sugar refinery, 
leather-processing factory, pharmacy  
Mauritius  stadium, bridges, airport terminal building 
Mozambique textile mill, passenger cargo vessel, water supply project, 
shoe factory, parliament building, housing project 
Namibia water supply project, civil housing project 
Niger stadium, water supply project, textile mills, housing project 
Nigeria railway upgrade 
Rwanda highway, cement factory, veterinary school 
Sao Tome & 
Principe** 
- 
Senegal stadium, water conservation project 
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Seychelles swimming pool, housing projects, schools 
Sierra Leone road bridges, stadium, sugar complex, office building, 
hydroelectric power station, civil housing 
Somalia medical teams, medicines, disaster-relief materials 
South Africa* - 
Sudan* - 
Swaziland** - 
Tanzania Tanzania-Zambia railway, textile mill, rice project, sugar 
factory, coal mine 
Togo conference building, sugar refinery, stadium, hospital, 
irrigation project 
Uganda stadium, rice projects, factories, 
Zambia Tanzania-Zambia railway, roads, factories, textile mill, 
water supply project 
Zimbabwe stadium, hospitals, dams, factories,  
* The amount of total aid is unknown 
** These countries have diplomatic ties with Taiwan. 
 
Source: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/default.htm
(20 March 2006) 
 
 
3. China-Africa Cooperation Forum 
 
China and Africa have set up various trade agreements in the past. 
The first initiative was taken as early as 1955 at the Bandung 
Conference. This agreement however, was merely political and while 
establishing diplomatic ties with African countries, economic and 
cultural agreements were signed by both parties. In 2000, the first 
large-scale conference on Sino-African trade was held in Beijing.  
 According to China, the purpose of the Sino-African Forum 
was ‘the construction of an international political and economic 
order and [to] explore new Sino-African cooperation’. Over 40 
African states with 80 foreign ministers and ministers in charge of 
international economic cooperation were present. In addition, 17 
international and regional organizations, NGOs and entrepreneurs 
were also in attendance to discuss South-South cooperation, the 
North-South dialogue, debt relief, and Chinese economic cooperation 
with African states.19 The conference produced two key documents, 
namely, the Beijing Declaration and the Programme for China-Africa 
Co-operation in Economics and Social Development. The latter 
described Chinese investments in Africa, financial cooperation 
between China and the African Development Bank Group (ADB), 
                                                 
19 www.china.org/english/features/China-Africa/82047.htm (5 April 2006) 
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debt relief and cancellation, agricultural cooperation, natural 
resources and energy, education and multilateral cooperation.20
 In 2003, the second China-Africa Cooperation Forum was held 
in Addis Ababa when Prime Minister Wen Jiabao declared that 
foreign assistance and investment ‘comes with the deepest sincerity 
and without any political conditionalities’. During the meetings in 
2000, South Africa raised the issue of debt relief, which China 
opposed. However three years later it announced debt relief for 
African countries to a total of US$1.27 billion and granted aid 
packages to several states. By making this gesture towards African 
states, China put itself on equal terms with the West regarding 
operations in Africa.21
 
 
4. Sino-African Trade 
 
The previous sections have described China’s relations with Africa 
during the twentieth century regarding politics, aid and trade 
agreements. China was geo-politically motivated in its support of 
Africa, as it was a way of opposing the super powers and western 
hegemony. China also shared a common identity with Africa, being a 
Third World country itself. However, in the 1990s this approach 
towards Africa became more pragmatic. This section offers insight 
into the state of China’s current relations with Africa, which are 
primarily based on trade. 
 The country’s post-Maoist era is characterized by economic 
expansion. The figure below shows the total value of China’s exports 
and imports between 1978 and 2004. It can be seen that from 1994 
onwards growth has increased and now exceeds US$100 billion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Muekalia, D.J. (2004) ‘Africa and China’s Strategic Partnership’, African Security 
Studies, 13 (1): 5–12. 
21 Alden, C. (2005) ‘China in Africa’, Survival, 47 (3): 147–64. 
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Figure 2:  China’s total imports and exports, 1978 – 2004 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005, National Bureau of Statistics of 
China 
 
 
Trade between China and Africa has quadrupled since 2000 when 
trade between Africa and China totalled around US$10 billion. Just 
five years later it had increased to US$28 billion. Table 3 shows the 
development of Sino-African trade between 1999 and 2003. China is 
now Africa’s third largest commercial partner after the United States 
and France, and the second largest exporter to Africa after France. 
Remarkably, Britain – as a former colonial power – has been left far 
behind by China.22
 
 
Table 3:  Sino-African trade, 1999 - 2003 (in US$ million) 
 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
6459.3 10563.5 10755.7 12346.9 18487.1 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005, National Bureau of Statistics of 
China 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Smith, B. (2006) ‘Western Concern at China’s Growing Involvement in Africa’, 
www.asiantribune.com/show_article.php?id=3102 (10 April 2006) 
 13
The economic relationship between Africa and China can be divided 
into three sections: China’s drive for resources such as oil, minerals, 
and food; new export markets for its products; and new investment 
opportunities for Chinese companies. Exports from Africa to China 
are primarily commodities and oil, while African imports from China 
consist of manufactured goods such as industrial products, electrical 
equipment and machinery, textiles and household utensils. 
 
 
Natural Resources 
China currently has the fastest growing economy in the world, with 
an annual growth rate of around 8%. But such rapid economic 
development in the post-Maoist era has required a steady and 
growing supply of oil. A major change came about in 1993, when 
China became an energy importer instead of a net exporter. China’s 
demand for oil has been so rapid that in 2004 the country became the 
world’s second largest oil importer after the US. The growing 
demand is due to not only an expanding economy but also to a 
generally wealthier society with its increased demand for consumer 
goods such as cars and fridges. It is estimated that the Chinese 
demand for oil will increase by 156% between the years 2001 and 
2025. 
 
 
Figure 3:  Oil demand and net imports, 1971 – 2004 
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Like the US, China is seeking new countries and different suppliers 
to fulfil its oil requirements in order to diversify its sources and 
achieve energy security. In Africa, where new reservoirs have 
recently been found, China has a every possible chance of success 
when it comes to exploiting new sources. To gain and retain control 
of these sources, it is allocating considerable military, politico-
diplomatic and economic resources.23
Africa owns around 8% of the world’s oil reserves and 11% of 
world oil production. It is estimated that production in Africa is 
rising 6% annually. By 2007, it will reach seven million barrels a day 
and by 2010 this figure is estimated to be eight million. New deep-
water oil discoveries have been made in the Gulf of Guinea, more 
specifically in Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. Even though 
Africa is notorious for its political and economical challenges, 
international oil companies are continuing to invest in the continent. 
This is because Africa is economically attractive for foreign investors 
as good conditions are offered by African leaders and most of the oil 
is being found offshore which has advantageous for the loading of 
tankers and provides a degree of stability in oil production levels. 
African oil is also of high quality.  
A quarter of China’s oil imports come from Africa: from 
Algeria, Angola, Chad, Sudan, Nigeria, Gabon and Equatorial 
Guinea. The thirst for oil is becoming so important that even the ‘One 
China Principle’ is being disregarded since Chad has diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan. A new pipeline from Chad to Cameroon 
opened in 2003 so that oil from Chad can be transported directly to a 
major port. Even though this trade in natural resources has a positive 
effect on the trade balance, it has some disadvantages as well. The 
production of oil merely requires capital investment and labourers 
are not required in large numbers. And in countries where oil is 
abundant, governments tend to focus on the wealth-generating oil 
sector and to neglect other sectors. Corruption is a frequent problem. 
Malaquias takes an extreme position when he claims that:  
                                                 
23 Alden, ‘China in Africa’. 
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All citizens become potential thieves with catastrophic 
consequences for stability – political, social, economic and 
legal – as the bases for interpersonal interaction are 
irremediably broken. Problematically, instead of fostering 
development, resource-wealth has been an important factor 
in the political instability, military conflict, social dislocation, 
and economic degradation that have characterized much of 
post-colonial Africa.24
 
Countries are seeking to diversify their energy resources to meet 
their growing needs for energy. As the need for energy becomes even 
greater in the future, the scenario described above can be expected to 
become more common. The international community has already 
accused China of unethical practices in Africa. The boxes below 
describe the cases of Sudan and Angola and their relationship with 
China.25
                                                 
24 Malaquias, A. (2005) ‘Thirsty Powers, the United States, China and Africa’s 
Energy Resources’, Paper for 3rd FLAD-IPRI international conference on ‘Portugal, 
the US and Southern Africa’. 
25 Ibid. 
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Box 2: China in Sudan 
 
Sudan’s total oil reserves are currently estimated at five billion barrels. The 
country produces about 500,000 barrels a day and this figure is likely to 
increase to 750,000 b/d in 2006. According to the WTO, oil exports to China 
accounted for 64% of Sudan’s total oil exports in 2004. 
 
China’s first oil imports from Sudan were in 1995. China’s National 
Petroleum Corporation began oil exploration there and has expanded 
steadily. In 1997, the US imposed economic and trade sanctions on Sudan 
and China then moved in to fill the gap that western countries had left. 
Currently, China National Petroleum is the largest shareholder and 
essentially controls the Sudanese energy sector as it is the main investor in 
Sudanese oil production. China covered the cost of most of the US$15 
billion 932-mile pipeline to Port Sudan where it is building a tanker 
terminal. In 2005, approximately 10,000 Chinese workers were employed in 
Sudan. 
 
Both China and Sudan benefit from this relationship. China has been able 
to diversify its oil resources and become less dependent on other oil-
producing countries while Sudan has found a reliable economic partner 
that does not question its domestic political situation. China has offered a 
financial lifeline to the Sudanese government.  
 
In addition, China’s position on the UN Security Council has meant that 
Sudan has avoided serious sanctions by the West. The UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1556 that demanded that the Sudanese government 
disarm the Janjaweed and bring to justice those leaders who had incited 
and carried out human-rights abuses. The Security Council threatened to 
consider further sanctions if the government failed to comply. China, as a 
permanent member threatened to use its veto power and urged the West to 
‘cool down’. As mentioned earlier, China has assisted Sudan financially 
and militarily even though it was aware of the widespread ethnic cleansing 
taking place in Darfur. Human Rights Watch has for this reason accused 
China of cooperating in the genocide in Darfur since 2003.  
 
In conclusion, good relations between the two governments have resulted 
in China being the main stakeholder in the oil business in Sudan. To 
procure oil for its expanding economy, China has supported the Sudanese 
government both financially and politically and ignored any related ethical 
issues. In other words, energy security overrides other concerns.  
 
Sources:  
Malaquias, A. (2005) ‘Thirsty Powers, the United States, China and Africa’s 
Energy Resources’. Paper for 3rd FLAD-IPRI international 
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conference on ‘Portugal, the US and Southern Africa’. 
WTO (2006) ‘Share of China in Selected Economies’ Merchandise Exports 
and Imports, 2000 and 2004’,  
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2005_e/chp_0_e/ch1.xls
(27 March 2006) 
Walta Information Centre (2006) ‘Africa: China&apos;s Great Leap into the 
Continent’, 
www.waltainfo.com/Analysis/2006/Mar/11022.htm (28 March 2006) 
HRW (2005) ‘The United Nations and Darfur’, 
https://www.hrw.org/wr2k5/darfur/3.htm (13 April 2006) 
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Box 3: China in Angola 
 
Angola is currently recovering from a thirty-year civil war and donors from 
western countries are assisting in the much-needed reconstruction of 
institutions and the economy. 
 
China is also present in Angola, assisting in infrastructure reconstruction. 
China’s offered Angola a ‘soft’ loan of US$2 billion with no political strings 
attached in March 2004. The terms of the loan specify its repayment within 
17 years at an interest rate of 1.5%. The money has been earmarked for 
reconstruction and development projects such as railways, electricity and 
administrative buildings. However, the terms of the agreement are 
advantageous for China as 70% of the construction projects are to be 
assigned to Chinese companies. Domestic contractors can be awarded only 
30% of the projects covered by the loan, a fact that is causing consternation 
among Angolan businessmen. The loan is not going to create opportunities 
for Angolans, which are vital for the livelihoods of the local people. A 
second important term of the agreement is that China can import 10,000 
barrels of oil a day from Angola. Angola currently exports 25% of its oil to 
China.  
 
The loan, which was initially intended for the reconstruction of the country, 
is being used for other purposes as well. According to Global Witness, 
some of the money has been used for government propaganda in the 2006 
elections. Global Witness has declared that part of the problem lies in the 
country’s unwillingness to be more transparent about its oil revenues. It 
prefers to sign commercial loans backed by oil than cheaper loans from 
large international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF that 
demand reforms and transparency. China’s loan therefore is undermining 
the international pressure being put on the government to invest in the 
development of Angola. 
 
Sources:  
Malaquias, A. (2005) ‘Thirsty Powers, the United States, China and Africa’s 
Energy Resources’. Paper for 3rd FLAD-IPRI international 
conference on ‘Portugal, the US and Southern Africa’. 
Servant (2005) ‘China’s Trade Safari in Africa’. 
www.mondediplo.com/2005/05/chinafrica (30 March 2006) 
Global Witness (2005) ‘Western Banks to Give Huge New Loan to Angola 
in Further Blow to Transparency’. 
www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/pdf/releases/gw_angola_2
30905.pdf (14 April 2006) 
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Another natural resource that China needs to import from Africa to 
support is own economic growth is timber. Until recently, the 
demand for timber was met by domestic lodgers. However in 1998, 
the Yangtze River overflowed resulting in 2,500 deaths and billions 
of dollars of damage. Following these floods, the Chinese 
government banned logging in large parts of China and has begun to 
protect its healthy forests and replant woodlands that had already 
been cleared for agriculture. These measures were taken to prevent 
further large-scale disasters, such as the 1998 floods. Internal 
pressure has forced China to import timber from other countries and 
imports of industrial wood have more than tripled since 1993. China 
is now importing considerable amounts of wood from the forests of 
Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Liberia. In 
Cameroon, the exports from illegal logging amount to 50% of total 
exports of wood, and in Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Liberia the 
figure has risen to 90%. The types of wood that are being exported 
are not declared in national trade statistics, which makes it 
impossible to determine the actual imports of different kinds of 
timber.26 According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
main exporting countries are Nigeria, the Central Africa Republic, 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.  
 China is the world’s leading exporter of textiles and clothing. 
In spite of its own domestic production, China still needs to import 
cotton, which it does from the US. However, the share of the African 
countries that export cotton – Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, Guinea, 
Nigeria, Togo and the Central African Republic – has increased since 
the mid 1990s.27
China not only imports oil and minerals from Africa, it also 
needs access to more agricultural land. With its increasing 
population and rapid industrialization, farmland in China has 
become scarce and in the future the country will have to rely on food 
imports to feed its own population.28 China is currently investing in 
agriculture, fisheries and related secondary production in Africa and 
has already signed contracts with Sierra Leone, Gabon and Namibia 
to allow Chinese fishermen to fish in their coastal waters. In addition, 
they have leased agricultural land in Zambia, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe.29
                                                 
26 Butler, T. (2005) ‘Timber Hungry China Moves into Africa’,  
http://news.mongabay.com/2005/0420x-tina_butler.html (18 April 2006) 
27 www.cottonchina.org/english/news/en_news_show.php (17 April 2006) 
28 Muekalia, D.J. (2004) ‘Africa and China’s Strategic Partnership’, African Security 
Studies, 13 (1): 5–12. 
29 Chinese Government (2002),  
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To conclude, certain African countries – mainly Sudan and Angola 
with their oil exports – are the prime exporters of African natural 
resources and commodities to China. Congo, Equatorial Guinea and 
Gabon export timber as well as oil, and exports from South Africa to 
China comprise mainly of manufactured goods. 
 
 
Figure 4: African exports to China, by country  
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005, National Bureau of Statistics of 
China 
 
 
Imports 
Africa does not only export natural resources and commodities to 
China. Many goods are also being imported from China. Even 
though the African market is relatively small for consumer goods – 
Africa’s population totals approximately 800 million – China has 
been able to find a ready market for its cheap, low-quality consumer 
products and it is trying aggressively to take control of the African 
market. According to one Chinese trade analyst, ‘Chinese products 
are well-suited to the African market. At the moment, China is in a 
position to manufacture basic products at very low prices and of 
satisfactory quality.’30  
 Many products are produced in state-owned factories in 
China and sold through a growing informal network of trading posts 
across urban and rural Africa. The number of Chinese traders in 
Africa has increased since the 1960s when Chinese traders settled in 
Africa on a large scale. In 1949, there were about 27,000 Chinese 
people in Africa and this number had grown to 130,000 by1999. Most 
                                                                                                                            
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/default.htm (20 March 2006) 
30 Alden, ‘China in Africa’. 
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of these traders settled in Mauritius, Madagascar and South Africa31 
but, according to observers, the number of Chinese in West Africa is 
increasing as well. These African traders import Chinese goods that 
are attractively priced for the African market where purchasing 
power is limited. African businessmen increase their profit margins 
by cutting out intermediaries. This is the case in almost all African 
countries and the African market is being flooded with cheap 
Chinese products.32
 Africa is a new and interesting market with excellent 
conditions for the Chinese with its many potential customers for 
cheap Chinese products. The imported goods are mostly household 
utensils, mechanical and electric products, textiles and clothes. China 
is focusing its exports on countries with large populations, for 
example, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria. These 
five countries, with their relatively high purchasing power by 
African standards, together account for 58% of African imports from 
China.  
 
 
Figure 5: African imports from China, by country 
 
21%
21%
12%
10%
7%
7%
6%
4%
4%3%
3%2%
Other
South Africa
Nigeria
Egypt
Morocco
Algeria
Sudan
Benin
Ghana
Togo
Kenya
Tanzania
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005, National Bureau of Statistics of 
China 
 
 
                                                 
31 Emara, N.M. (n.d.) ‘Afro-Chinese Relations in the New Millennium’, 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Publications/349/350/352/363/374.htm
 (31 March 2006) 
32 www.africa-business.com/features/chinese_goods.html (26 March 2006) 
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One of the main commodities that China exports to Africa is textiles, 
a sector in which it is able to compete with Africa due to its low 
labour costs. In fact, Chinese textile exports are undermining local 
African production and concern about this is growing. China has 
increased its textile and clothing exports even further since its 
accession to the WTO in 2001. Table 4 shows the rapid increase in 
China’s share of the market since becoming a member of the WTO. 33
 
 
Table 4:  China’s share of total imports, in selected countries 
 
 Textiles (%) Clothing (%) 
 1995 2002 1995 2002 
Australia 
Japan 
South Africa 
Switzerland 
19.3 
41.1 
5.9 
3.9 
35.2 
66.5 
18.5 
5.2 
54.3 
59.1 
29 
8.8 
70.4 
77.5 
56.3 
9.3 
 
Source: WTO (2004) ’The Global Textile and Clothing Industry Post the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing’ 
 
 
Recently, the share of Chinese textiles in the South African market 
increased even further and 86% of South Africa’s clothing imports 
currently come from China. 
 Not only has the domestic market been affected by the sudden 
rise of China. Exports of African textiles have also been hit. The 
growth of Chinese exports to the US is negatively affecting the 
previously promising growth that African exports were enjoying in 
this field. This negative impact on African exports comes from the 
ending of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), which had allowed 
countries like the US to place quotas on clothing and textile imports 
from certain countries. The MFA lasted for 30 years from 1974 until 
2004 and was designed to set quotas on the levels of imports of 
textiles and clothing from ‘developing’ to ‘developed’ countries, 
essentially safeguarding industries in the industrialized countries 
and controlling the level of market access for imports from 
developing countries. In 2000, the US and 48 African states drew up 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act, (AGOA), which gave 
African states full access to the American market and resulted in 
                                                 
33 WTO (2004) ‘The Global Textile and Clothing Industry Post the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing’,  
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers5_e.pdf  
(31 March 2006) 
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textiles becoming a major growth opportunity. Southern Africa in 
particular began to focus on its textile industry. However once the 
MFA ended on 1 January 2005, the export of Chinese textiles to the 
US began to flourish and African exporters could not compete. More 
than ten clothing factories in Lesotho closed in 2005, and South 
African exports to the US dropped from US$26 million in the first 
quarter of 2004 to US$12 million in 2005. 34
 China’s involvement in the African textile sector is not new 
and the country has always been pragmatic about international 
trade. In 1999, Chinese investors set up factories in Lesotho and 
Swaziland to take advantage of the AGOA agreement and have 
duty-free access to American markets. In this way, China could 
avoid US and EU quotas on Chinese textiles. When the MFA ended, 
China simply closed the factories, leaving thousands of people 
unemployed. Production in China itself was cheaper and therefore 
more profitable.  
 
                                                 
34 Princeton N. Lyman (2005) ‘China’s Rising Role in Africa’, 
www.cfr.org/publication/8436/chinas_role_in_africa.htm (18 April 2006)  
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Box 4: Chinese Arms in Africa 
 
Arms have always been among the Chinese commodities exported to 
Africa. During the struggle for independence, China exported arms to fight 
western imperialism and, later, China supported African states with 
weapons during the Cold War. An ideology for a new world order lay at 
the root of these exchanges. And China is still exporting arms to certain 
countries although the ideology behind these exports has become more less 
idealistic. 
 
Selling arms to some African leaders improves bilateral relationships and 
can enhance Chinese access to oil and natural resources. China does not 
demonstrate much concern for human rights, which is something they 
consider a western concept. Some experts say that China is now selling 
military equipment worldwide and views Africa as a potential market for 
the sale of military hardware. The involvement of China in African politics 
also becomes clear when one looks at the military exchanges between 
China and African states. Over the years Chinese defence ministers have 
paid numerous visits to their African colleagues and vice versa. 
 
According to the Congressional Research Service, China’s arms sales to 
Africa between 1996 and 2003 made up 10% of all arms transfers to Africa. 
During the Ethiopian–Eritrean war in 1998, it delivered arms to both sides 
for a total of more than US$1 billion. China sold the Sudanese government 
weapons and helicopters that were used in Darfur to terrorize the local 
people. 
 
In 2000, Zimbabwe delivered eight tons of Zimbabwean ivory in exchange 
for a shipment of small arms. And in 2004, China sold the Zimbabwean 
army 12 fighter jets and 100 trucks in a deal worth more than US$200 
million. The shift of allegiances by President Mugabe is understandable: 
having been rejected by the West, he designed a new ‘Look East’ policy. 
Nowadays, nearly all Zimbabwe’s trade is with China, which is investing 
in minerals, roads and agriculture. 
 
Sources: 
Servant (2005) ‘China’s Trade Safari in Africa’, 
www.mondediplo.com/2005/05/chinafrica (30 March 2006) 
Chinese Government (2002) 
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/default.htm (20 March 
2006) 
Pan (2006) ‘China, Africa and Oil’, www.cfr.org/publication/9557  
           (18 April 2006) 
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Chinese Investments 
A third characteristic of trade relations between Africa and China is 
investment by Chinese companies in Africa. By 2004, nearly 700 
Chinese companies were operating in 49 African countries. Chinese 
state companies invest mainly in oil, mines, fishing, woods and 
precious metals and infrastructure and also in sectors that the West 
has neglected because they are less profitable. For example, China 
has reopened the Zambian copper mines and is looking for oil fields 
off the coast of Gabon. In 2004, Chinese investments in Africa 
accounted for more than US$900 million. This is around 6% of total 
investments of US$16 billion in Africa.35
 Not surprisingly, China is investing in countries where it is 
getting its natural resources from. In 2004, oil-exporting countries 
such as Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan accounted for 54% of total 
Chinese investments. Zambia is also an important trade partner and 
China recently reopened the Chambezi Mining Company. Other 
countries that received a relatively large share of Chinese trade were 
Ethiopia and Botswana.36 According to the Chinese, Botswana has a 
politically stable environment and enjoys amicable relations with its 
neighbouring countries. Moreover, its products enjoy free access to 
the whole Southern African market. All these factors are in fact 
positive reasons why increasing numbers of Chinese businesses and 
investments – ranging from construction, textiles, services and 
wholesale and retail industries – are coming to Botswana.37
Not all Chinese investment in Africa is viewed positively by 
the international community. First, Chinese (construction) firms have 
lower costs and can consequently outbid their western competitors, 
winning contracts for projects. International observers fear that the 
Chinese way of doing business – paying bribes and attaching no 
conditions – undermines local efforts to increase transparency and 
good governance. And the IMF and the World Bank are unable to 
then put as much pressure on countries because they are supported 
by China. Finally, Chinese companies are bringing their own 
labourers to work in Africa. In areas where unemployment is already 
high, the effects of migrant Chinese labour will be felt over time. For 
example in Angola, some domestic suppliers and retailers have had 
to close down because they could not compete with the Chinese. In 
other parts of Africa resentment against the Chinese is also being 
                                                 
35 Marks, S. (2006) ‘China in Africa – the New Imperialism?’,  
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/32432 (28 March 2006)  
36 Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005, National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
37 http://bw.china-embassy.org/eng/dszc/Info/P020050928144852194783.pdf  
(18 April 2006)  
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felt.38 Though each of these critiques is legitimate in its own right, the 
selectivity with which they are put forward sometimes raises 
questions about the sincerity of the commentator. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Relations between Africa and China have increased over the years. 
Before 1990, the relationship was characterized by a shared struggle 
against western hegemony, with China assisting Africa in three 
ways. They supported nationalist movements with arms to fight 
colonization; large construction projects were initiated such as the 
Tazara Railway, and China sent medical teams to Africa and 
provided scholarships for African students to study in China.  
 In the 1990s, the relationship between China and Africa 
gradually changed. The approach became more pragmatic and 
economic development was clearly China’s priority. With an annual 
growth rate of 7%, the Chinese economy expanded enormously, and 
accessing natural resources became a priority. China had to broaden 
its horizons. Africa, with all its seemingly unlimited natural 
resources, was an ideal partner. In addition, the African continent as 
a whole was a potential market for China’s low-value manufactured 
commodities.  
 Exports from Africa to China are based on natural resources: 
oil is the most important resource. About 25% of Chinese oil imports 
are from Africa, with its major sources being in Sudan, Angola, 
Nigeria and Chad. Other important resources are cotton and timber, 
the latter often being exported illegally to China. Furthermore, China 
is investing in the agricultural sector because the land available for 
agriculture in China is decreasing as its population increases. African 
imports from China are primarily low-value commodities to 
countries with large populations, for example, South Africa, Nigeria, 
Algeria and Egypt. Current trade relations between China and Africa 
involve a high degree of investment by Chinese companies in Africa 
with construction projects in infrastructure development, buildings 
and factories. 
                                                 
38 Alden, ‘China in Africa’.  
 
 27
 Sino-African trade and aid relations have implications for 
Africa. One advantage is the increased room for manoeuvre for 
African states now that they are no longer totally dependent on the 
West. In addition, increasing oil production has boosted the revenue 
of African states. On the other hand, the Chinese way of doing 
business does not take into account human rights, the environment 
or good governance, though this is also not uncommon among 
western countries when dealing with Africa. The Chinese 
government states very clearly that the import of oil is its top 
priority. Exports of textiles and household utensils from China 
dominate the African market and, as a consequence, African factories 
have had to close and people have lost their main source of income.  
 In conclusion, Sino-African trade has many implications for 
Africa. The continent as a whole is currently China’s third biggest 
trading partner, after the United States and France. Statistics show, 
on the other hand, that Africa is less important for China. In spite of 
increased oil exports from Africa, the continent’s total trade with 
China amounts to only 2% of its international trade. China is fast 
becoming a dominant player in Africa.  
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